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Abstract 
Biomass produced from perennial energy crops is expected to contribute to UK 
renewable energy targets, reducing the carbon intensity of energy production.  The UK 
government has had incentive policies in place targeting both farmers and power plant 
investors to develop this market, but growth has been slower than anticipated.  Market 
expansion requires the interaction of farmers growing these crops, with the construction 
of biomass power plants or other facilities to consume them.  This paper uses an agent-
based model to investigate behaviour of the UK energy crop market and examines the 
cost of emission abatement that the market might provide.  The model is run for various 
policy scenarios attempting to answer the following questions:  Do existing policies for 
perennial energy crops provide a cost effective mechanism in stimulating the market to 
achieve emissions abatement?  What are the relative benefits of providing incentives to 
farmers or energy producers?  What are the trade-offs between increased or decreased 
subsidy levels and the rate and level of market uptake, and hence carbon abatement?  The 
results suggest that maintaining the energy crop scheme, which provides farmers’ 
establishment grants, can increase both the emissions abatement potential and cost 
effectiveness.  A minimum carbon equivalent abatement cost is seen at intermediate 
subsidy levels for energy generation.  This suggests that there is an optimum level that 
cost effectively stimulates the market to achieve emissions reduction. 
 
  
Introduction 
Biomass could supply 8-11% of the UK’s total primary energy demand by 2020 (DfT, 
DECC, & DEFRA, 2012), and form a significant part of meeting the legally binding 
target of 15% of its energy consumption from renewable sources (DECC, 2011a).  The 
greatest growth in UK domestic biomass supply is expected to come from agricultural 
residues and energy crops (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 2012).  It has been suggested that 
between 930 and 3630 kha of land in England and Wales could be used for growing 
dedicated perennial energy crops, Miscanthus and willow or poplar grown as Short 
rotation coppice (SRC), without impinging on food production (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 
2012).  However, uptake of these crops has been limited; only 11 kha in 2011, with the 
planting rate dropping to only 0.5 kha yr
-1 
from 2008-11 (DEFRA & Government 
Statistical Service, 2013), with evidence this is driven by farmers behaviour causing a 
spatial diffusion process (Alexander et al., 2013).  Although there is currently no target 
for areas of these crops, 350 kha by 2020 was suggested in the Biomass Strategy 
(DEFRA, 2007), but it is now expected that the actual figure will be much lower (Aylott 
& McDermott, 2012). 
 
Different policies have been available to support the UK energy crop market.  Subsides 
have been targeted at both the farmers and the energy producers.   Farmers in England 
have had access to grants covering 50% of the establishment costs for planting 
Miscanthus or SRC (Natural England, 2009).  While renewable electricity generators 
have been able to receive support under the Renewable Obligation (RO) mechanism 
(Ofgem, 2013).  The number of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) electricity 
generators receive varies based on the amount renewable electricity generated, and a 
support band determined by technology and commissioning date.  These certificates can 
then be sold (from 2009 to 2012 prices have ranged been between £37 to 40 ROC
-1 
(Ofgem, 2012)), providing the generator with a premium in addition to the wholesale 
electricity price.  More recently, Renewable Heat Incentives (RHIs) have also been 
available for the generators of renewable heat.  However the existing subsidy 
arrangements are in flux; the RO scheme ends in 2017, and the energy crops 
establishment grant closed to new applications at the end of August 2013, although 
planting of approved areas will continue, potentially until 2015.  Electricity Market 
Reform (EMR) proposals, which are effectively the replacement for RO, have been 
published (DECC, 2013a).  The stated aim of the EMR proposals is to decarbonise 
energy generation in a cost-effective manner, while maintaining security of supply.  It 
contains three main elements; a feed-in tariff using Contract for Difference (CfD), a 
carbon price floor, and a capacity market.  Under CfD, generators revenues, from 
electricity and ROCs, is replaced by a single fixed price level known as the ‘strike price’.  
The draft CfD strike prices are claimed to have been set to be consistent with the ROCs, 
however dedicated biomass would require combined heat and power (CHP) facilities to 
receive support (DECC, 2013a).  It is unclear whether there will be a replacement for the 
Energy Crop Scheme, or the timing or the form that any replacement might take, but 
there are calls for a new scheme (Aylott & McDermott, 2012; Lindegaard, 2013). 
 
Biomass energy is sometimes assumed or stated as having zero net emissions of Carbon 
dioxide (CO2) (Al-Mansour & Zuwala, 2010; Bertrand, 2013), or given a zero emissions 
factor (HM Treasury & HM Revenue & Customs, 2010).    However, although the carbon 
released during the energy production as been captured during the growth of the plant, 
there are direct and indirect sources of potential emissions.  Direct emissions relate to the 
production, transport, handling and processing lifecycle stages, while indirect emission 
can occur due to land use change potentially causing soil carbon changes.  Several 
assessments of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been undertaken for energy crop 
production or related generation technologies (Bullard & Metcalfe, 2001; Bauer, 2008; 
St. Clair, Hillier, & Smith, 2008; Cherubini & Jungmeier, 2009; Wiltshire & Hughes, 
2011; Perilhon et al., 2012).  These have typically assumed average values for energy 
crop yield, transport distance and power plant parameters.  In fact these will vary, for 
example between farms, due to the location of production and consumption, and by the 
size and type of power plant.  Although there is some work including spatially specific 
crop yields to determine maps of potential emissions (Hillier et al., 2009), no study to 
date has considered how the behavioural aspects of adoption, such as imitation of 
behaviour and diffusion of innovation, may impact the resulting emissions, or how this 
might be impacted by changes in subsidies. 
 
This paper uses an agent-based model to investigate the UK energy crop market and 
examines the cost of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) abatement that the market could provide.  An 
existing GHG balance assessment (St. Clair, Hillier, & Smith, 2008) is used as a 
framework to assess the emissions.  The model is run for various policy scenarios, 
representing possible subsidy trajectories and divisions of support between farmers and 
energy producers, attempting to answer the following questions:  Do existing policies for 
perennial energy crops provide a cost effective mechanism in stimulating the market to 
achieve emissions abatement?  What are the relative benefits of providing incentives to 
farmers or energy producers?  What are the trade-offs between increased or decreased 
subsidy levels and the rate and level of market uptake, and hence carbon abatement?  A 
sensitivity analysis is also conducted to determine the behaviour of the system to a range 
of parameters, the results of which are used to further understand the policy scenario 
results.  The paper describes the method for calculation of emissions from generating 
energy crop electricity and emissions avoided from displacement of this electricity from 
another source.  The agent-based model and the scenarios used are then outlined, before 
the results are then presented and discussed. 
  
Materials and methods 
Emissions from energy crop electricity generation 
Emissions for each energy crop and associated management were calculated based on 
initial estimates set out in St. Clair et al. (2008), with some modifications.  Emissions 
from the production of the Miscanthus rhizomes, willow cuttings and removal of the crop 
at the end of its productive life were added.  Emissions associated with the production of 
Miscanthus rhizomes have been estimated as 278.7 kg CO2e ha
-1 
(Bullard & Metcalfe, 
2001).  For willow cuttings an estimate of 174.2 kg CO2e ha
-1
 was used since no specific 
figure was available and it was assumed emissions proportional to the level of input 
required to grow the rhizomes and cuttings, as approximated by their respective costs 
(Turley & Liddle, 2008).   Emissions were also added for crop removal; both crops were 
assumed to require broad-spectrum herbicide and sub-soiling.  Fertiliser application 
practices were assumed to follow the National Non-Food Crops Centre guidelines 
(NNFCC, 2010a, 2010b).  Miscanthus does not require significant fertiliser application as 
it recycles nutrients into the rhizome.  However at establishment it is recommended to 
apply 85 kg ha
-1
 N and 45 kg ha
-1
 each of P and K (NNFCC, 2010a).  An additional 40 kg 
ha
-1
 N may also be required and these are assumed to be applied after year 5 and 10.  For 
SRC willow, sewage sludge or manure is recommend at establishment and after each 
harvest.  The use of 100 kg ha
-1
 of N from 0.6% N manure at establishment and after each 
harvest application was assumed (NNFCC, 2010b).  The application of fertiliser creates 
direct emissions from increased production of nitrous oxide (N2O) due to the higher 
levels of N, and indirect emissions from volatilisation, leaching and run-off.  Emissions 
are also caused by the fertilisers’ production, transport and application.  The direct 
emissions are estimated to be 1% applied (IPCC, 2006), with lower indirect rates through 
volatilisation, leaching and run-off.  However for inorganic fertilisers the production 
emissions can be significant (Wood & Cowie, 2004).   Using a farm carbon calculator 
(Hillier, 2013) the impact of each of the fertiliser regimes was estimated assuming well 
drained soil, of medium soil organic carbon (between 1.72% and 5.16% soil organic 
matter), and medium texture.  The emission for Miscanthus was estimated as 915.1 kg 
CO2e ha
-1
 at establishment and 518.8 kg CO2e ha
-1
 in years 5 and 10.  For SRC willow, 
the estimate was 428.9 kg CO2e ha
-1
 for each manure application (Hillier, 2013).  No 
account was taken of changes in soil organic carbon; the justification and potential 
consequences of this assumption are explored in the discussion section.  Table 1Table 1 
summarises, for each energy crop, the emission parameters associated with crop 
production. 
 
Handling for on-farm storage and handling for transport loading and unloading where 
both estimated as 3.29 kg CO2e t
-1 
(Elsayed, Matthews, & Mortimer, 2003).  Haulage 
emissions where taken as 0.17574 kg CO2e t
-1 
km
-1
, assuming a return trip with an 
average load returning empty for an articulated carrier >33t (DECC, 2013b).  Biomass 
Ash disposal was included in the transport cost assuming 60 kg t
-1
 of fuel is used 
(Elsayed, Matthews, & Mortimer, 2003).  As these figures are for mass of material 
handled and crop yield are in oven dried tons tonnes (odt), these figures were adjusted to 
account for moisture contents of 15% for Miscanthus and 30% for SRC willow (Hillier et 
al., 2009).  Storage is calculated using tons tonnes of fuel produced (tp), while 
transportation is calculated using tons tonnes of fuel supplied (ts).  Where crops are 
unsold, these figures will differ in a given period. 
 
The CO2 produced by the combustion in the electricity generation process is not included, 
as unlike other fuels, it does not increase atmospheric CO2 since an equivalent amount is 
captured during crop growth.  However methane (CH4) and N2O, gases with higher 
global warming potentials (Forester et al., 2007), are both emitted and need to be 
included in these calculations.  The rate of emission per MWh of feed fuel (MWhf) were 
taken as 0.0072 kg CH4 MWhf
 -1
 and 0.018 kg N2O MWhf
 -1 
(Elsayed, Matthews, & 
Mortimer, 2003).  The construction of a biomass power plant involves significant GHG 
emissions associated with the production of steel and concrete (Jungmeier, Resch, & 
Spitzer, 1998).  Emissions per MWh of installed plant capacity (MWhi), was taken as 
38.5 kg CO2 MWhi (Georgakellos, 2012).   These construction emissions are fixed, and 
once the plant is built will occur whether the plant operates at full capacity or not.  Table 
2Table 2 gives a summary of these figures. 
 
To demonstrate how these figures are used to calculate emissions, we use an exemplar of 
the emissions to produce 1 MWh of electricity (MWhe).  Taking a 12 odt ha
-1
 yield on 
both crops and a transport distance of 50km, with the same 1.6 tortuosity factor, and a 
biomass electricity plant with 30% efficiency, gives a total equivalent emissions of 91 kg 
CO2e MWhe
-1
 for Miscanthus and 102 kg CO2e MWhe
-1
 for SRC (Figure 1Figure 1).  
These figures are in-line with previously published figures.  Evans et al.(2010) reviewed 
previous assessments of CO2 equivalent emissions from biomass generation, finding a 
mean of 62.5 kg CO2 MWhe
-1
, with the highest being 132 kg CO2 MWhe
-1
.  The highest 
figure was for SRC willow power production (Styles & Jones, 2007).  These values also 
lie within the range published in the UK Biomass strategy for SRC chips (DfT, DECC, & 
DEFRA, 2012). 
 
Abated emissions 
Electricity generated from perennial energy crops displaces generation from other 
sources.  In 2010, the UK grid emissions were 522 kg CO2e MWhe
 -1
, with 457 kg CO2e 
MWhe
 -1
 from direct sources and 65 kg CO2e MWhe
 -1
 from indirect sources, i.e. 
production and distribution of fuel (AEA, 2012).  Using the same indirect emissions, the 
figures for coal and gas were 951 kg CO2e MWhe
 -1
 and 400 kg CO2e MWhe
 -1
, 
respectively (DECC, 2013b).  Figure 2Figure 2 compares coal, grid and gas CO2e 
emissions to the example cases for Miscanthus and SRC willow.  Although the displaced 
source could be considered to change over time and the grid average figure is expected to 
reduce (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 2012), the use of coal has recently increased, now 
accounting for 39% of the UK’s electricity generation in 2012 (DECC, 2013c).  
Accordingly the analysis was undertaken with both the coal and grid average emission 
factors. 
 
Agent-based model 
An agent-based model (ABM) of the perennial energy crop market (Alexander et al., 
2013) was used to simulate the market development under various scenarios.  ABM 
allows the dynamic representation of decision makers and their interactions, with the 
system behaviour emerging through agent interactions with one another and their 
environment (Rounsevell, Robinson, & Murray-Rust, 2012).  The approach was selected 
as an ABM allows the spatial and dynamic behaviour of complex systems to be 
investigated (Zimmermann, Heckelei, & Domínguez, 2009), and supports the two-way 
interaction between micro and macro scales (Happe, 2004), features which many other 
approaches find intractable.  
 
A summary of the construction and workings of the model used are described here, full 
description is available in Alexander et al. (2013).  The model has a set of farmer agents 
and a set of power plant investor agents (see Figure 3Figure 3).  Farmers each manage a 
1km
2
 (100 ha) parcel of agricultural land, making crop selection decisions based on their 
resources (including spatially specific crop yields (Tallis et al., 2012; Hastings et al., 
2014)), individual preferences and market conditions.  Each farmers first applies a 
behavioural test to determine whether they are willing to consider adoption, before 
applying a farm scale economic model with risk aversion, to determine an optimum crop 
selection given their spatial resources and initially randomly allocated preferences 
(Alexander & Moran, 2013).  Farmers’ willingness to consider adoption is determined by 
drawing on their own previous experience, or where there have none, by looking at the 
local level of adoption in their neighbour farms.   Farmers are taken as willing to consider 
energy crops if the proportion of successful local adoption is greater than their threshold 
value, which is randomly assigned from a normal distribution.  The initial rate of 
adoption, or proportion of innovators (Rogers, 1995), is the fraction of farmers willing to 
consider adoption without any previous local adoptions, the baseline value is 2.5%.  
Areas unsuitable for energy crops for social or environmental reasons were constrained 
for selection (Lovett, Sünnenberg, & Dockerty, 2014).  Power plant investor agents make 
decisions to invest in the construction and operation of power plants, that consume the 
energy crops, based on the expectation of the project achieving an internal rate of return, 
on their investment, greater than their hurdle rate (Oxera Consulting, 2011).  A single 
delivered market price exists, which was adjusted exponentially at each year based on the 
level of market disequilibrium, i.e. if there is excess demand the price is increased, while 
if there is excess supply it is reduced.  All monetary values were calculated in 2010 
terms. 
 
The model runs with a time-step of one year, starting in 2010 and continuing until 2050.  
A detailed description of the market emerges as the model runs proceed, including farm 
crop selected at a 1km
2
 resolution and knowledge of the sites, sizes and technologies of 
the electricity power plants.  This allows specific calculations of the emissions for each 
lifecycle stage, as the location of supply (including crop spatially specific yields), 
demand, and with known transport distances.  Specifically, the model output helps to 
determine CO2e emissions associated with the production of electricity from the energy 
crops, the emissions avoided from displacement of the same amount of conventional 
electricity generation, and the cost of subsides provided to support market development.  
The total CO2e emissions abated and the total cost of subsidy were determined across the 
40-year time period, allowing an average implied cost of carbon abatement to be 
calculated. 
 
The model has stochastic elements, and therefore requires multiple runs to explore the 
distribution of output
1
.  For each scenario a set of 20 runs were executed and the results 
of this set analysed.  There are computational constraints to doing increasing numbers of 
runs, the results presented represents 1.93 million (SPECfp) hours of CPU time on the 
Edinburgh Compute and Data Facility (Richards & Baker, 2008).  The behaviour was 
determined for a range of subsidy policy scenarios, and other scenarios, chosen as part of 
a sensitivity analysis, detailed below. 
 
Scenario and sensitivity definitions 
Subsidies are available for the producers of electricity, through renewable obligation 
certificates (ROCs).  The rate of future allocation over time is not known, so alternative 
scenarios were examined.  It was assumed that the current rate of 2.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 
would continue until 2014 and then decrease, as per the Renewables Obligation Banding 
Review 2013-17, to reflect the expectation of lower costs (DECC, 2011b).  It was also 
assumed that decreases would occur over 10 years and then reach a constant level.  This 
lower level was varied from 0.0 to 2.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
, see Figure 4Figure 4.  Total 
revenue from sales of electricity and ROCs are shown on the secondary y-axis.  The 
scenario with a minimum of 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 is taken as the baseline scenario, which 
brings it more into line with the default ROC band (Ofgem, 2013).  The ROC rate is 
determined using the plant construction date, and held constant for the lifetime of that 
                                                 
1
 The model can be configured with a random number seed.  If the same seed is used, the 
pseudo-random events follow the same sequence and repeatable results are obtained.  The 
results presented have an automatically generated and different seed for each run. 
plant; i.e. it assumes grandfathering rights of ROC payments as per the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change proposals (DECC, 2011b).  In addition, farmers can 
currently receive grants for perennial energy crops; the current rate is 50% of 
establishment costs (Natural England, 2009), and this is taken as the baseline scenario.  
The model behaviour was determined for each of the ROC rate scenarios with 
establishment grant rates of 0%, 50% and 100%.  
 
The parameters used for the sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 3Table 3.  Climate 
scenarios are taken from the UKCP09 climate data, with the category specifying the 
climate forcing emission scenarios (Murphy et al., 2009), and were used to estimate 
energy crop and conventional crop yields (Alexander et al., 2014). 
  
Results 
Policy scenario results 
As the model proceeds from 2010 to 2050 the crop selection and power plant locations 
vary, causing changes in the level and cost of emissions abatement.  In general, as the 
market expands over time, the annual abatement start from a low level and increases, 
while the cost of carbon starts high and gradually decreases.  Figure 5Figure 5 shows the 
output from a sample run from the 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 minimum ROC rate scenario, 
assuming that coal generation is displaced.   
 
These values were annualised over the modelled period of 2010-50, for each run, and 
plotted as a carbon price against an annualised CO2e reduction.  The results using an 
establishment grant of 50% and minimum ROC rates of 0.6-1.4 ROC MWhe
 -1
 are shown 
in Figure 6Figure 6. The variability in results, within a scenario, as shown on this scatter 
plot, is caused by the model’s stochasticity.  In the 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 scenario, three 
distinct clusters can be observed.  First, a high carbon price (~£82 t CO2e
 -1
) and low 
emissions reduction potential (~0.1 Mt CO2e), second a more moderate carbon price 
(~£60 t CO2e
 -1
) and somewhat higher emissions reduction (~0.5 Mt CO2e), and finally a 
similar carbon price (~£60 t CO2e
 -1
), but greater emissions reduction (~2 Mt CO2e).  
Within each cluster of results a consistent geographic pattern is observed.  Figure 7Figure 
7, points A, B and C show examples of the 2040 distribution of power plants and 
farmers’ energy crop selection from each cluster, with the corresponding case marked in 
Figure 6Figure 6.  The frequency of runs where a significant market is not established, 
Figure 6Figure 6, point A, increases as the minimum ROC rate is reduced.  At a 
minimum ROC rate of zero, all runs exhibit this behaviour.  In scenarios with a minimum 
ROC rates above 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
, cases occur where a more widespread market 
develops (Figure 7Figure 7, point D).  The prevalence of runs showing such widespread 
patterns increases as the subsidy rate increases.  The geographic spread also increases at 
higher subsidy levels (Figure 7Figure 7 point E). 
 
The carbon prices were plotted against the mean annual emission reduction between 2010 
and 2050, assuming displacement of coal, for each establishment grant rate (Figure 
8Figure 8).  The resulting curves display how the level of support available to electricity 
generators, via ROCs, affects both the level of uptake (and hence emissions reduction), 
and the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy regime.  As demonstrated in Figure 6Figure 6, 
there is variation between each run for any set of parameters.  Figure 9Figure 9 shows the 
50% establishment grant curve with error bars for the standard deviation of both emission 
reductions and the carbon price, using grid average electricity generation displacement.  
The variation in the potential behaviours (Figure 6Figure 6 and Figure 7Figure 7) leads to 
relatively a high standard deviations, particularly at lower subsidy levels. 
 
Varying the electricity generator subsidy scenario, for a fixed establishment grant rate, 
produces a u-shaped curve of carbon price against emissions reduction, as shown in 
Figure 8Figure 8.  This indicates that there is a subsidy level that offers a maximum cost-
efficiency of carbon equivalent abatement.  At lower subsidy levels lower market uptake 
occurs, leading to lower abatement, but at a higher total subsidy cost per unit of CO2e 
abated.  At subsidy levels above the minimum carbon price level, a greater market 
adoption and so greater carbon abatement emerges, but the increased rate of subsidy also 
leads to progressively higher costs of carbon.  Table 4Table 4 shows the points for each 
establishment grant scenario with the lowest carbon price, showing the emissions 
reduction and carbon price assuming both coal and grid average generation displacement.  
Comparing the three abatement curves in Figure 8Figure 8 shows the 50% establishment 
grant scenario is always at or above the no establishment grant scenario.  Therefore a 
subsidy level with a 50% establishment grant is always at least as cost-effective at 
producing any level of abatement as an alternative with no establishment grant.  Between 
the 50% and 100% establishment grant scenarios the situation is more complex.  The 
100% scenario has higher abatement, often at relatively small extra cost of carbon, 
however the lowest cost is on the 50% establishment grant curve. 
 
The abatement curve for 50% establishment grant rate is shown in Figure 8Figure 8 and 
Figure 9Figure 9 respectively, calculated assuming coal and grid average displacement.  
Similarly, Table 4Table 4 shows both figures for the most cost-effective points for each 
establishment grant scenario.  These show that the coal assumption has a close to 
doubling of the abatement potential and consequently a halving of the cost of abatement, 
in comparison to the grid average.  The electricity generation that could be considered to 
be ‘displaced’ may change over time and the grid average figure is expected to reduce 
over time (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 2012).  Therefore it could be argued that using 
current coal displacement overstates the emissions abatement.  However, the rise, from 
29% to 39% in 2012, of coal usage to generate the UK’s electricity provides some 
justification for considering both options (DECC, 2013c).  Also biomass electricity is 
dispatchable and non-intermittent, like coal, which is likely to be increasingly important 
within a generation mix with growing amounts of intermittent and non-dispatchable 
renewables, such as wind and solar. 
 
Sensitivity analysis results 
The sensitivity analysis for the model runs using the parameter adjustments (in Table 
3Table 3) is shown in Figure 10Figure 10.  Results are categorised into scenarios that 
reduce emissions abatement, have no significant effect, or increase abatement, see Table 
5Table 5. 
   
Discussion 
The model scenarios provide a range of policy-relevant insights that are discussed further 
here.  The reasons for the model behaviour, limitations of the approach, and opportunities 
for further research are also considered. 
 
The current Energy Crop Scheme, providing farmers with 50% establishment grants, 
appears to fulfil an important role in stimulating market development and increasing the 
cost-effectiveness of carbon abatement (Figure 8Figure 8 & Table 4Table 4).  The current 
scheme closed to new applications in at the end of August 2013, and it is not clear what, 
if anything, will replace it.  There is some expectation that this will cause the currently, 
albeit limited, market momentum to be lost (Lindegaard, 2013), as occurred during the 
previous gap in funding in 2006 (Aylott & McDermott, 2012).  The results here also 
suggest there could be implications for the size and efficiency of the energy crop market; 
i.e. lower uptake, emissions abatement, and cost effectiveness, if no replacement is put in 
place.  Even if higher subsidy levels were available to the power generators, the overall 
system would achieve less adoption and more costly emissions reductions without direct 
farmer support.  The results also suggest that increasing the farmer support for energy 
crops, above 50% of establishment cost, increases total abatement from the market, at a 
relatively small increase in the carbon price (a 100% establishment grant supports a six-
fold increase in abatement to 6.7 Mt CO2e for a £1 t CO2e
-1
 increase in carbon price, 
compared to the 50% establishment grant).  However there are many other polices, e.g. 
changes to single farm payments, that could be constructed that would provide alternative 
mechanisms to stimulate farmers to adopt energy crops, with only the existing Energy 
Crop Scheme having been modelled and investigated.  Therefore further investigations 
are merited.  Proposals have been made by others, to providing farmers with interim, flat-
rate payments per hectare over the first 5-6 years (Lindegaard, 2013), the impact of which 
are worth exploring. 
 
High sensitivity is seen to the establishment grant rates.  It was the only subsidy 
adjustment examined that encourages greater uptake and emissions abatement, while not 
significantly increasing the carbon price (Figure 10Figure 10).  Moving from the baseline 
50% rate to 100% shows an increase of abatement from 1.1 to 6.7 Mt CO2e yr
-1
, (with 
coal generation displacement), with only a marginal implied carbon price increase from 
£63 t CO2e
-1
 to  £64 t CO2e
-1
.  The high sensitivity to the rate of this subsidy is a 
consequence of it providing support across all time periods. Similarly, Figure 8Figure 8 
shows that, at higher levels of abatement, the 100% establishment grant is more cost-
effective.   
 
Subsidising farmers directly, rather than via the biomass plants therefore appears to have 
potential benefits.  This may be due to the distribution of margins between farmers and 
power plant operators; for example, in the baseline scenario, 86% of gross margin went to 
farmers.  The adoption of energy crops by farmers requires them to overcome opportunity 
costs, and to make a return on the establishment investment.  Since there are obvious 
(land) barriers to entering the supply of biomass, farmers could also be viewed as 
oligopolists.  Supply prices, therefore, have a tendency to increase to the level where 
power plants are only marginally profitable.  The main assumption that drives this 
behaviour would appear to be a single delivered market price for all market participants.  
Perhaps in reality, due to transactions costs, farmers might get a poorer deal.  Opportunity 
for further work exists in investigating how transactions costs and market power alter the 
behaviours and efficiency of the market overall. 
 
Intermediate subsidy levels have been shown to produce maximum cost effectiveness 
(Figure 8Figure 8 & Table 4Table 4), as the subsidy level increases the reduced failure 
rate and increased plant sizes allow for a more efficient system to emerge.  Initially, the 
efficiency gains are sufficient to offset the increasing subsidy cost, leading to falls in the 
carbon price.  Eventually, the costliness of the measure overcomes any efficiency gains, 
creating a rising carbon price, perhaps due to reduced scope for further efficiency gains 
once the market is already well established.  The crossover produces the minimum carbon 
price observed.  Where a market fails to establish, there are inefficiencies as some 
farmers may have planted crops and power stations have been built that may not be 
economic.  The results show higher rates of farmers switching away from established 
energy crops at lower support levels.  The level of negative experience of energy crops 
varies from 92% at 0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 to 3% at 2.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
, due to higher prices and 
less susceptibility to having crops that cannot be sold or that need to be transported large 
distances.  Benefits from economies of scale arise as larger markets are able to support 
larger power plants, which have lower per MW construction costs and higher power 
efficiencies (Mott MacDonald, 2011).  Model runs start by initially selecting 1MW grate 
plants, before potentially moving through 10MW grate plants, to then be dominated by 
30MW circulating fluidised bed (CFB) plants, with some 300MW CFB plants selected in 
the highest adoption scenarios.  Although not represented in the model, the availability of 
machinery for planting and harvesting these crops would act to increase these economies 
of scale (Aylott & McDermott, 2012).  If all the areas suitable for energy crops were to be 
selected, any increases in subsidy would not create additional uptake, and would only 
result in higher subsidy costs without additional abatement.  However, even in the highest 
support scenario, with 100% establishment grant and 2.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
, the average 
maximum energy crop area obtained 2.9 Mha, which is less than the published upper 
estimate of 3.63 Mha that could be grown without impinging on food production (DfT, 
DECC, & DEFRA, 2012).  At these levels, higher support still encourages greater uptake 
and produces further emissions abatement. 
 
Examining the behaviour of other parameters, a high sensitivity was observed in the 
behavioural aspects of farmers’ adoptions, through the initial rate of farmers willing to 
consider adoption (Figure 10Figure 10).  If adoption rates were to be increased, perhaps 
through awareness or otherwise reducing farmers’ perceived barriers, this would be 
expected to have a substantial effect on the rate and level of uptake.  There is evidence, 
from both empirical and modelled results, that a spatial diffusion process of adoption is 
created by farmers’ behaviours, leading to long time lags, of at least 20 years, before full 
adoption is approached (Alexander et al., 2013).  Although some studies on the topic 
have been conducted (Sherrington, Bartley, & Moran, 2008; Convery et al., 2012), there 
is still considerable uncertainty in this area and scope for more work to investigate 
psychological barriers to adoption of novel crops, and methods to enhance awareness or 
increase knowledge exchange through farmer social networks, in an attempt to stimulate 
uptake. 
 
Electricity prices showed the largest sensitivity of the parameters tested, with a change in 
electricity price of £10 MWhe
 -1
 either side of £50 MWhe
 -1
 having a dramatic impact.  
The sensitivity to electricity prices is greater than that to the minimum ROC rates.  This is 
because revenue changes occur immediately and over the entire period, whereas changing 
the ROC rate takes effect gradually, and only reduces revenue for plants built after 2015.  
The reduction in the carbon price with increased electricity prices is due to this additional 
plant revenue not being accounted for as a subsidy. 
 
The impact on soil organic carbon (SOC) is not included in this analysis.  There are 
potential changes in SOC due to direct land use change (dLUC), when a previous land 
use is displaced by growing energy crops, and indirect land use change (iLUC), where the 
displaced previous land use potentially shifts to an alternative area, possibly in another 
part of the world (Gawel & Ludwig, 2011).  SOC changes from energy crop dLUC can 
be estimated from soil type and former land use (Hillier et al., 2009).  If iLUC occurs, the 
resulting SOC changes are uncertain, but potentially large relative to the carbon impacts 
of growing and using bioenergy crops (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 2012).  The UK biomass 
strategy suggests the theoretical maximum available land, in England and Wales, for SRC 
and Miscanthus, that does not impinge on food production, to be between 0.93 and 3.63 
Mha (DfT, DECC, & DEFRA, 2012).  Other land use studies suggest that large areas of 
land could be available, based on assumptions regarding the rate of technology 
development and the effect on production levels (Rounsevell et al., 2006), implying that 
even the high adoption scenarios might be feasible in terms of land availability.  All 
model runs fall within the upper range, and only the runs towards the highest support 
levels (100% establishment grant and minimum ROC rate > 1.6 ROC MWhe
 -1
) have an 
average area of energy crops above the lower estimate, implying the iLUC impact may be 
small.  Due to the nature of the model, crop selection varies over time, and therefore areas 
selected for energy crops may only produce for a short time period.  Such reversibility 
makes accounting for dLUC more problematic, in part contributing to its exclusion from 
the analysis.  Where iLUC does occur, the exclusion of both land use changes should act 
to offset one another. 
 
The model represents the UK energy crop market with dedicated biomass power plants, 
without including other sources of demand or supply of biomass.  Other sources of 
demand exist for biomass, e.g. existing coal fired power stations, either through co-firing 
or complete biomass conversion, and also other types of biomass facilities, such as 
dedicated biomass plants with CHP.  Similarly, there is supply from imports, crop 
residues, wastes and forestry.  The modelling simplification can be partially justified 
because of the current RO payment rates.  There is a 0.5 ROC MWhe
 -1
 premium for 
dedicated biomass plant using energy crops, at current levels this equates to £18.50 
MWhe
 -1
, providing a significant incentive to solely use these crops.  The current RO rates 
do not have a premium for energy crops usage in co-firing, providing from only 0.5 ROC 
MWhe
 -1
, compared to 2.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 for new dedicated biomass plants (Ofgem, 
2013).  It is believed that at these rates, it is not economic to use energy crops for co-
firing (DECC, 2012).  However EMR proposes to remove the energy crop premium and 
stop funding dedicated biomass power plants in favour of CHP (Aylott & McDermott, 
2012), impacting on how the market may develop (Chazan, 2013).  Although there may 
be problems finding suitable sinks for heat, particularly with the larger plants (Chazan, 
2013).  This potential policy change means that further work to include CHP, is required, 
and ideally should also include other sources of biomass.  Although it is difficult to 
quantify the impact of including these aspects on system behaviour the increase in market 
efficiency with higher subsidy levels appears robust and would be expected to be 
maintained.  Adding alternative uses would reduce the overall cost of carbon if perverse 
incentives were avoided in the policies implemented, i.e. the economic and emissions 
scenarios are aligned. 
 Results suggest that directly supporting farmers, via an establishment grant, improves 
cost effectiveness of subsides in reducing GHG emissions, and increases the abatement 
potential.  A subsidy level with a 50% establishment grant is always at least as cost-
effective at producing any level of abatement as an alternative with no establishment 
grant.  Further increasing farmer support, to 100% of the establishment costs, is 
suggested to provide a substantial increase (six-fold) abatement potential, at a relatively 
low increase in carbon price (£1 t CO2e
-1
).  The dedicated energy crop market may be 
able to achieve a cost of carbon, assuming coal generation displacement, of around £60-
70 t CO2e
-1
, which is in line with a carbon price floor at 2030 (HM Treasury & HM 
Revenue & Customs, 2011).  Abatement potentials are sensitive to subsidy levels, with 
between 2 and 10 Mt CO2e at these carbon prices, rising up to 25 Mt CO2e, at higher 
carbon prices.  Using grid average emissions in place of coal as the displaced fuel 
approximately halves the net emissions reductions. 
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Tables 
Table 1.  Perennial energy crop production emission parameters (Sources: St. Clair et al. 
2008, Bullard & Metcalfe 2001). 
Operation Occurrence Miscanthus  
(kg CO2e ha
-1
) 
SRC willow  
(kg CO2e ha
-1
) 
Site preparation At establishment 119.2 70.8 
Rhizomes / cuttings At establishment 278.7 174.2 
Planting At establishment 278.3 251.5 
Herbicide / Pesticide At establishment 35.6 26.8 
Fertiliser See table notes 915.1
a
 / 518.8
b
 428.9
c
 
Harvesting At harvest
d
 48.8 57.9 
Removal At end of 
productive life
e
 
63.4 63.4 
Notes: 
a) Fertiliser applied at Miscanthus establishment. 
b) Fertiliser applied at years 5 and 10 for Miscanthus. 
c) Fertiliser applied at SRC establishment and after every harvest. 
d) Miscanthus harvested annually, and SRC willow harvested every 3 years. 
e) 16 and 21 year productive life for Miscanthus and SRC willow respectively. 
  
Table 2.  Emission parameters by lifecycle stage. 
Source Units Value 
Miscanthus production kg CO2e ha
-1
 219.3
a
 
SRC willow production kg CO2e ha
-1
 210.6
a
 
Storage kg CO2e tp
-1
 3.29 
Loading / unloading kg CO2e ts
-1
 3.29 
Transport kg CO2e km
-1
 ts
-1
 0.1863
b
 
Power plant construction kg CO2e MWhi
-1
 38.5 
Power plant operation  kg CO2e MWhf
-1
 5.54 
Notes: 
a) Annualised over crop productive life 
b) Including ash return transport 
 
  
Table 3.  Parameters used for the sensitivity analysis scenarios. 
Parameter Low Baseline  High 
Initial farmer adoption rate (%) 1.25 2.5 5 
Climate emissions scenario Low
a
 Medium
a
 High
a
 
Transport costs: Miscanthus/SRC willow 
(2010 £ odt
-1
 km
-1
) 
0.135/0.085 0.27/0.17 0.54/0.34 
Maximum transport distance (km) 40 80 120 
Establishment grant rate (%) 0 50 100 
Minimum ROC rate (ROC MWhe
 -1
) 0.6 1.0 1.6 
Electricity Price (2010 £ MWhe
 -1
) 40 50 60 
ROC adjustment rate: period (years) Fast: 5 10 Slow: 20 
Note: 
a) Low, Medium and High climate emissions denote the climate forcing in the UKCP09 
climate scenarios (Murphy et al., 2009). 
 
  
Table 4.  Scenario with minimum cost of CO2e abatement for each establishment grant 
rate. 
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No establishment 
grant 
1.4 26 0.1 0.5 130 0.9 66 
50% establishment 
grant 
1.2 73 0.2 1.3 120 2.6 61 
100% establishment 
grant 
1.0 187 0.6 3.4 126 6.7 64 
 
  
Table 5.  Sensitivity analysis results classified into parameters that reduce abatement, 
have no significant impact, or increase abatement. 
Parameter Reduces 
abatement 
No significant 
change 
Increases 
abatement 
Initial farmer adoption rate  Low  High 
Climate emissions scenario  Low & High
a 
 
Transport costs  Low & High  
Maximum transport distance Low High  
Establishment grant rate Low  High 
Minimum ROC rate Low  High 
Electricity Price Low  High 
ROC adjustment rate Fast  Slow 
Note: 
a) Low, Medium and High climate emissions denote the climate forcing in the UKCP09 
climate scenarios (Murphy et al., 2009). 
 
  
Figure legends 
Figure 1. CO2 equivalent emissions for 1MWh of electricity generated from Miscanthus 
and SRC willow, assuming a yield of 12 odt ha
-1
 and a 50 km transportation 
distance, area proportional to emissions. 
Figure 2.  Total (direct and indirect) emissions, as CO2 equivalent, to generate 1MWh of 
electricity in the UK from various fuels (AEA, 2012; DECC, 2013b).  Areas are 
proportional to emissions and sources overlaid, with the lower emissions fuels 
towards the top. 
Figure 3.  Schematic representation of the main agent processes and interactions within 
the perennial energy crop market model (Alexander et al., 2013). 
Figure 4.  ROC rates scenarios by year of plant construction. 
Figure 5.  Carbon price and emissions reduction for each year from a sample run (Figure 
6, point C) of 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 minimum ROC rate scenario. 
Figure 6.  Scatter plot of individual runs with various ROC rates and 50% establishment 
grant showing cost of carbon abatement against emission reduction, with coal 
generation displaced. 
Figure 7.  Example distributions of energy crop selection and power plant locations at 
2040, A,B & C from examples 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 minimum ROC rate scenario, D & 
E showing highest CO2 equivalent abatement from 1.2 & 1.4 ROC MWhe
 -1
 
minimum ROC rates runs. 
Figure 8.  Cost of carbon abatement against annual emission reduction for various 
subsidy policies, assuming displacement of coal generation.  The values below each 
point show the minimum ROC rates (ROC MWhe
 -1
) used in that scenario. 
Figure 9.  Carbon price against emission reduction, using gird average generation 
displacement, as minimum ROC rate is varied and 50% establishment grant, error 
bars showing standard deviations from a set of 20 runs for the same set of 
parameters. 
Figure 10.  Sensitivity of carbon price and emissions reduction to a range of parameter 
adjustments assuming displacement of coal generation.  Note: Low and High climate 
emissions denote the climate forcing in the UKCP09 climate scenarios (Murphy et 
al., 2009). 
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Figure 1. CO2 equivalent emissions for 1MWh of electricity generated from Miscanthus 
and SRC willow, assuming a yield of 12 odt ha
-1
 and a 50 km transportation distance, 
area proportional to emissions. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Total (direct and indirect) emissions, as CO2 equivalent, to generate 1MWh of 
electricity in the UK from various fuels (AEA, 2012; DECC, 2013b).  Areas are 
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 Figure 3.  Schematic representation of the main agent processes and interactions within 
the perennial energy crop market model (Alexander et al., 2013). 
 
 Figure 4.  ROC rates scenarios by year of plant construction. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Carbon price and emissions reduction for each year from a sample run 
(Figure 6Figure 6, point C) of 1.0 ROC MWhe
 -1
 minimum ROC rate scenario. 
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 Figure 8.  Cost of carbon abatement against annual emission reduction for various 
subsidy policies, assuming displacement of coal generation.  The values below each point 
show the minimum ROC rates (ROC MWhe
 -1
) used in that scenario. 
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 Figure 9.  Carbon price against emission reduction, using gird average generation 
displacement, as minimum ROC rate is varied and 50% establishment grant, error bars 
showing standard deviations from a set of 20 runs for the same set of parameters. 
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 Figure 10.  Sensitivity of carbon price and emissions reduction to a range of parameter 
adjustments assuming displacement of coal generation.  Note: Low and High climate 
emissions denote the climate forcing in the UKCP09 climate scenarios (Murphy et al., 
2009). 
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